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Debt bondage, seasonal migration and alternative issues : 
lessons from Tamil Nadu (India)
 
1
 
Kamala Marius-Gnanou*
 
Introduction
 
Debt bondage
 
 2
 
 in India is often associated with seasonal migration and extreme
poverty. Actually, scheduled castes and scheduled tribes
 
 3
 
 are over-represented
among the poor and the landless : the all India average indicates that, typically,
bonded labourers belong to Scheduled Castes (61.5 %) and Scheduled Tribes
(25.1 %), and are male (97.5 %), married (72 %), illiterate (80 to 91 %). Most of
bonded labour households are landless (63 %), mostly involved in agricultural
work (80 %) [Government of India, 1991].
It seems important to observe the variants of bonded or unfree labour in the
context of India’s seasonal agriculture. It is now recognized that migration is an
integral part of the survival strategies of the poor. Although researchers focused for
a long time on rural/urban migrations – totally neglecting other forms of migration
1. The fieldwork was conducted with Venkatasubramiam (Research Engineer) from French Institute of
Pondicherry.
This study has been conducted thanks to the French Institute of Pondicherry – www.ifpindia.org – in
Microfinance research program « Indebtedness, Vulnerability to Bondage and Microfinance » resp I. Guérin
for the International Labour Organisation (Social Finance Unit).
* Geographer, Associate Professor UMR Ades (CNRS/Bordeaux3), University of Bordeaux – k.marius-
gnanou@ades.cnrs.fr.
2. In India, the bonded labor system [abolition] act of 1976 gives an official definition of bonded labor
and of debt bondage. Here we use a simplified version used by the International Labour Organisation. One is
in debt bondage if:
– S/he has an outstanding loan /advance from the employer in cash and /or in kind
– Due to this, s/he or any other member of the family is forced to work for the same employer – credit as
an element of control over the labor
– S/he is paid less than the market wages for the work done because of a loan / advance – exploitative
working conditions including longer working hours
– S/he lacks freedom to move around and change employers due to the loan / advance and may be forced
to sell the produce to the employer at a lower rate.
3. Scheduled Castes (SCs), ex-untouchables and Scheduled Tribes (STs) are Indian communities that are
explicitly recognized by the Constitution of India as requiring special support to overcome centuries of discri-
mination by mainstream Hindu society.
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– rural/rural migrations have now become the subject of greater attention. While
this point has won unanimous support, the impact of migration on relations of
exploitation is still very much debated. The literature witnesses endless debates on
the « voluntary » character or not, of this type of work relation.
Various studies [Jodhka, 1994] undertaken during the 1990s showed that this
bondage system, at least in its traditional form, gradually fell into disuse, in parti-
cular in the green revolution areas. Capitalist farming, actually, necessitates the
mobility of “free labour” that is not bound to landlords ; it has also, conversely,
contributed to the reinforcement of debt bondage through a system of advance
controlled by the labour broker or jobber. In our study the relationship between
employers and cane cutters is indirect because the latter are recruited through
jobbers (
 
maistries)
 
, which avoids the risk of recruitment and reduces the cost of
transportation and the search for a job. In this paper we investigate the link between
debt bondage and seasonal migration, with particular attention to landless migrants
such as cane cutters. Our objective is to determine whether debt bondage is positi-
vely correlated or not to seasonal migration.
In India and Tamil Nadu, sugar cane is grown by large farmers from the domi-
nant agricultural castes, who also dominate the sugar cooperatives. Migrant
workers, who cannot find sufficient work to sustain themselves throughout the year
in their own regions, migrate to harvest the cane over eight months or so of the year.
With a production of 28.3 million tonnes in 2006-2007
 
 4
 
, India is the second
largest producer of sugarcane in the world after Brazil. This sector supports over
50 million farmers and their families
 
 5
 
. In 2007, the domestic sugar consumption
was estimated to 20 million tonnes. In spite of a better regulatory environment
since 1993, sugar is still highly regulated at the central and state levels. The indus-
trial production of sugar cane first started in the 70s with the green revolution under
the impulse of sugar mills of the public sector organised as state cooperatives.
However, the numerous dysfunctions of the public sugar mills (corruption, bad
management, over production…) regularly provoked interruptions in activity,
which did not encourage the producers to long-term conversion because of a lack
of prospects.
However, from the 80s onwards the involvement of the private sector and of its
capital has progressively changed the picture. The private sector then decided to
resort to a migrant work force, the simplest way being to contact middlemen in
zones traditionally productive.
This paper is based on three fieldworks conducted in February 2004, August
2007 and February 2008 in ThondiReddi Palayam, a hamlet located some 15 km
from Villipuram. In 2004, most of the villagers were seasonal migrants. They leave
the village for nearly seven months to States of Orissa and Andhra Pradesh. Out of
nearly 200 inhabitants, three-fourths of them were seasonal migrants. The remainder
 
4. indiastat.com.
5. KPMG report in www.indiastat.com.
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consists of old people, landlords, and people (mostly women) who used to own
livestock and stay in the village. Labourers migrate for sugarcane harvesting with
the entire family : husband, wife and children. This research involved informal
interaction with maistries, migrants, landowners and mill officers.
It is divided in three parts : the first discusses some of the main theories on debt
bondage, seasonal migration and sets out an analytical framework. Secondly, we
describe our case study of debt bondage and seasonal migration in sugarcane
industry with fieldwork evidence. Thirdly, we provide some alternative issues
before concluding.
 
Debt bondage and seasonal migration : analytical framework
 
The progressive disappearance of the traditional forms of bondage
 
The labourer in bondage and the free wage labourer stand at two ends of a conti-
nuum of degrees of servitude [Ramachandran, 1990, p. 170]. By definition, a
bonded labourer is one who cannot choose freely between alternate employers, and
who cannot, in fact, work for any person other than his or her current employer.
In India, debt bondage is historically a typically rural phenomenon, which fell
under a whole set of relations of rights and obligations between the masters and
their dependents. This system falls under a more global system of hierarchy and
interdependence between castes, while reflecting the very strong concentration of
land in the hands of the higher castes. Jan Breman has extensively described this
type of patron-client relation, and the reality that he describes in Gujarat seems
quite similar to that described by the villagers of Tamil Nadu when they evoke the
situation of their parents and grandparents. The names vary with the region : 
 
Halis
 
in Gujarat, 
 
Padiyals
 
 in Tamil Nadu, 
 
Admias
 
 in Kerala, 
 
Mulyias
 
 in Orissa, etc.
[Breman, 1979, p. 7] The terms employed allude either to the name of the caste or
to the relation between the landowner-employer and the worker, with a more or less
negative connotation, ranging from a patron-client relation to a master-slave rela-
tion. It should be noted that this is not really a question of employer-employee
relation ; the payments received by the workers are not considered as a 
 
payment
 
 in
return for their work, but rather entail in the 
 
responsibility
 
 of the « patron »
[Breman, 1979, p. 17]. Various studies undertaken during the 1990s showed that
this system, at least in its traditional form, gradually fell into disuse, in particular in
the irrigated areas and those that were converted to cash crops [Jodhka, 1994]. This
observation was made notably in Gujarat [Breman, 2003], in Uttar Pradesh, Andhra
Pradesh and in Bihar [Byres 
 
et alii
 
. 1999]. For example, in Andhra Pradesh, the
farmers had on average 25 permanent workers (
 
jeetam
 
) in 1958, as compared with
10 in 1973 and 1 in 1995 [Da Corta, 1999, p. 86]. The same evolution is observed
in Tamil Nadu : between 1985 and 1990, the number of 
 
padiyal
 
 (Tamil word desi-
gnating bonded workers) reduced considerably. In the 1970s and even the 1980s, it
was still customary for a farm of average size to have 3 or 4 
 
padiyals
 
 [Marius-
Gnanou, 1993]. The green revolution was accompanied by the phenomenon of
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« absentee landowners » and by the dislocation of large properties (in particular
those of the Reddiars, Nadis and Mudaliars) and, finally, by the emergence of a
more intensive and more capitalistic agriculture, generally managed by the middle
castes (Vanniar, Gounder) [Marius-Gnanou, 1993, p. 22] with no more intergene-
rational farm servants.
While this traditional bondage relationship tends to disappear, an important
feature of contemporary agricultural bondage appears : many of the seasonal
migrants are forced into migration by indebtedness.
 
New forms of debt bondage : seasonal migration through brokers
 
Theories of migration often shift between two extremes : the neo-classical
approach which focuses on individuals maximizing economic gains [Harris,
Todaro, 1973], and the approach of structuralists, who see migrant workers as
being locked into the capitalist world system and having to move cyclically
between domestic (pre-capitalistic) and capitalistic modes of production [Bhaduri,
1973 ; Breman, 1986].
We can ask ourselves one question : why do labourers migrate seasonally ? The
answer to this question depends on social norms, religious and cultural factors ;
according to Rogaly 
 
et alii
 
 [2001] migrants from West Bengal are all men because
it is their duty to feed the household. In fact, migration is a question of job availa-
bility. Individuals migrate to the region where work is available and where they can
earn enough money to improve their financial situation.
Breman [1996, p. 53] invokes the term « circulation », which, according to him,
accounts better for these movements, both of short duration and from one place to
another and/or from one sector to another (from one season to another or in the
course of the same season, the migrants regularly change activities : agriculture,
construction, daily work in an industry, brickyards, etc.), with regular returns to the
native village. « Migration turns into circulation when the employment is of limited
duration. A marked example of this is provided by seasonal workers who leave
their villages, often accompanied by wives and children, to escape the agrarian
cycle by working as cane-cutters or brickmakers » [Breman, 1996, p. 53].
Although these forms of circular migration have probably always existed, it is
obvious that they have widely developed in the last decades because of the trans-
port and communication facilities, changes in the modes of agricultural production
and because of the development of industrialisation. No exact data exist making it
possible to quantify the magnitude of seasonal migrations. The only available data
are from the National Commission on Rural Labour (NCRL), but they are probably
greatly under-estimated. NCRL puts the number of circular migrants in rural areas
alone at around 10 million in 1999-2001 (including roughly 4.5 million inter-State
migrants and 6 million intra-State migrants). According to NCRL, the majority of
seasonal migrants are employed in cultivation and plantations, brick-kilns, quar-
ries, construction sites and fish processing. In India, large numbers of seasonal
migrants work in urban informal manufacturing, construction, services or transport
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sectors, employed as casual labourers, head-loaders, rickshaw pullers and hawkers
[Deshingkar, Start, 2003].
Several studies conducted by Breman in Gujarat and by Rogaly’s research team
in West Bengal analyse the causes for labourers to leave the place of origin. Their
findings show that several influential socio-economic and cultural factors motivate
departure. Poverty is seen as the main factor causing labourers to leave the village.
Poverty, explained as insufficient income, is associated with a lack of decent
employment opportunities within the village and with low salaries. Several other
factors also emerge to explain under-employment in rural Indian economies : the
introduction of machines in the production process, whether in agriculture or tradi-
tional manufacturing [Mukherjee, 2001], and bad climate, with a lack of rainfall in
Tamil Nadu [Marius-Gnanou, 1993], and numerous floods in West Bengal [Rogaly
 
et alii
 
, 2001 ; Rafique, 2003]. There is not enough work for everyone, and the result
is that those who are unable to find a well-paid job move away from the village to
earn a living in other rural regions.
Some authors consider that migration, whatever its type, offers workers the
opportunity to leave traditional patron-client relations. Rogaly 
 
et alii
 
 [2001]
describe a situation in West Bengal that contrasts with that investigated by Breman
[1996] in Gujarat : the former mentions a (relative) power of negotiation, for the
workers were able to avoid the collusion among employers, while the latter had no
manœuvring room or possibility to express themselves or make demands. Other
authors, on the other hand, underscore the fact that capitalist agriculture, just like
industry, perpetuates certain forms of exploitation and creates new ones : the
modern forms of exploitation would be the result no longer of the concentration of
land but of the concentration of capital. Contrary to some prejudices, debt bondage
would thus not be a relation proper to feudal or pre-capitalist societies [Kapadia,
1999, p. 447] ; Brass mentions in this respect the term “deproletarianisation”.
Breman considers that these new forms of bondage are the direct expression of new
forms of accumulation [Breman, 1996, p. 168]. To view the relation of indebted-
ness as a simple advance – without taking into account the multiple dependencies
thus engendered and the derisory wages that result – would only be the reflection
of neo-liberal interpretations blind to the mechanisms of exploitation and reproduc-
tion of inequalities [Da Corta, 1999, p. 77].
The central question is not so much that of indebtedness, but the manner this
indebtedness and the resulting dependency relations function [Mosse 
 
et alii
 
, 2001,
p. 71] Nevertheless, as Jan Breman underscores, indebtedness remains a funda-
mental aspect of capitalist modes of regulation : new forms of indebtedness give
rise to new forms of bondage, which he also calls « capitalist » forms of debt
bondage [Breman, 1996, p. 9, 56].
 
The “advance” (munpannam) system
 
This type of seasonal labour circulation has become increasingly common in
India due to the green revolution, large-scale irrigation schemes and other forms of
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modernisation of the Indian agriculture. For a long time, people used to migrate
within short distances to harvest crops and dig irrigation canals before returning to
their villages. Ideally, this type of capitalist farming, which certainly requires the
mobility of « free labourers » who are not bound to a landlord, has contributed to
reinforce debt bondage through a system of advance – “
 
munpannam
 
” – offered by
the labour broker or jobber or 
 
maistry
 
.
Labour is organised through a multi-tier system of contracting, subcontracting
and piece rate which involves a hierarchy of labour brokers, jobbing recruiters,
supervisors and labour gang leaders.
The jobber
 
 
 
usually originates from the same caste as the team that he recruits for
work in the sugarcane fields [Breman, 1996], in brickworks, in diamond-cutting
[Kapadia, 1995] or in power loom workshops [Neeve, 2001]. Jobbers are ideally
from the same caste of the same taluk and village ; they are, in most cases, villagers
who are better-off, and were formerly workers or supervisors. They control both
the recruitment of their workers and their work in the plantations or in the factories.
The amount of money needed by jobbers to recruit members of their team is
usually larger than the sum advanced to them by the factory. They have to comple-
ment it with a loan from a moneylender ; the workers are then charged for the high
interest rate that they have to pay. During the season the debt often increases even
further because the migrants borrow small sums from their gang boss.
This labour broker system frees the employers from having to enter into direct
relationships with the workers. The employers benefit above all from the enormous
savings, both in terms of money and organisation, provided by the labour broker
performing the functions of recruiter, foreman, and camp boss.
However, while a well-established jobber
 
 
 
may receive advances from the
employers/contractors to whom he supplies labour, newly established recruiters
have to risk their own capital to provide advances, or take out additional loans from
moneylenders. In selecting jobbers, preference is given to those migrants who have
already been involved in the plantations or factories for several years. The contrac-
tors/employers will only rely on jobbers and advance them money if they believe
that they will come up with reliable, regular, hardworking and compliant labour
gangs. Only a trusted jobber who is able to make generous advances acquires a
dependable labouring group [Mosse 
 
et alii
 
, 2001, p. 72]. The jobber
 
 
 
slowly builds
on his status. At the start of his career (
 
kijai maistry
 
), he is allowed to recruit a
limited number of workers. If his work is satisfactory, he can bring along larger
teams next time and become a 
 
mel maistry
 
. A certain stratification exists within the
jobber corps, and at the top, a small core can supply the largest teams, and are more
trusted by the employer, compared to the smaller brokers who are dependent on the
moneylender.
The workers are usually recruited on the basis of units (
 
pannai
 
) or sets of a
dozen persons including husband, wife and other major or minor persons of the
family. This contract system is usually highly segmented. In the detailed study of
the seasonal circulation of unskilled workers in rural areas of Gujarat, [Breman,
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1985, p. 192], quarry workers are recruited from Bharuch districts, while the cane
cutters are from the neighbouring state of Maharashtra. Because of this recruitment
system, labour migration established a long-term stable relationship between the
place of work and the area of recruitment.
A critical part of this process is the ability to bind migrating groups through big
advance payments. Jobbers
 
 
 
and labourers admit that their employers are trying to
bind them and they describe their work relation as a situation of 
 
kottadimai
 
 or
bonded labour. The labour broker is a major instrument in the realisation of this
type of exploitation. However, we have to admit that most labourers in rural areas
ask for an advance to survive during the slack season, it is included in the contract
labour even in “free labour relation”.
We have to state that different types of recruitment offer different opportunities
in the search for work. All the migrants are not recruited through 
 
mounpannam
 
 by
jobbers, but can travel in groups or alone with experienced migrants and can exploit
kinship connections. The kin network is a ticket to the urban labour market and to
finding a regular job under better conditions [Marius-Gnanou, 2004]. Without
social networks, migrants are more vulnerable to intimidation or non-payment of
wages, and are unable to get out of debt or overcome a crisis. This kind of labour
contracting can end when ever/workers’ unions fight against this system as in West
Bengal [Rogaly 
 
et alii
 
].
 
Case study : cane cutters in Tamil Nadu
 
Evidence from fieldwork : the village of ThondiReddi Palayam
 
ThondiReddi Palayam is a hamlet belonging to the 
 
panchayat
 
 (administrative
unit) of Arpisiampalayam (855 households), located some 15 km from Villipuram.
The classic structure of Tamil villages is found in this village : one part is reserved
for people of caste, landowners (20 families) in this case ; apart from a few
Vanniars, Naïkers, the “dominant caste” is mainly comprised of Reddiyars and the
other part – the 
 
colony
 
 – reserved for Dalits
 
 6
 
 (here, it is Paraiyars, 170 families).
Almost all the land is held by the Reddiyars, with rice and sugar cane as the main
crops. The organization of the village rests on a very strong division of labour. The
village has undergone numerous changes over the last twenty years and this strong
“complementarity” has gradually been eroded, under the effect of different factors
most of all, the gradual disappearance of the 
 
Padiyal
 
 : “many 
 
Paraiyars
 
 traditio-
nally used to work permanently for a 
 
Reddiyar
 
 landowner and were their depen-
dents” (
 
Padiyal
 
). The 
 
Padiyal
 
 would receive 70 Rs. per month and a bag of paddy
per harvest (twice or thrice a year) ; he also receives daily a dose of arrack – a kind
of locally produced liquor. He had to be available 24 hours a day, to take care of the
 
6. The word “Dalit is the term used by the untouchables” ; it means “held under check”, “suppressed”,
or “crushed”, or, in a looser sense, “oppressed”. The terms Scheduled castes and scheduled tribes are also
used in the Indian legal system to refer to this social group in India.
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livestock and the irrigation and of course to work in the fields ; his wife was given
the domestic work such as maintaining the garden and small livestock. She would
receive one rupee per day and a bag of paddy at each harvest ; the children would
also take care of the livestock and some of them would receive up to 2 Rs. per day
[Viramma, Racine, 1995].
According to the villagers, this system was still widely dominant in the 1980s,
before gradually disappearing. Some villagers consider that to be a 
 
Paraiyar
 
 is to
be “attached” to a Reddiyar. As a Paraiyar summarized it in evoking their erstwhile
situation : “we gave them our brawn, they – the Reddiyars – gave us money for
rituals ; both needed each other, they are our “
 
andan
 
” (gods)”. On the one hand, the
new production techniques – mechanization, new forms of irrigation – no longer
require a permanent labour force. First adopted by the large landowners in the
beginning of 1970s, the mechanization of agriculture has progressively extended to
most of the production units, largely encouraged by various government incentives,
especially the granting of tractors managed by the state cooperatives of the
 
panchayats
 
. This process of mechanization had become the norm by the end of the
1990s. On the other hand, the 
 
Paraiyars
 
 themselves, largely influenced by various
movements demanding rights for Dalits, were numerous in refusing this system of
dependence and now prefer looking elsewhere for a job, even if this means migra-
ting. The new job opportunities and the attrition of the discriminations linked to
untouchability has facilitated this process. The status of 
 
Padiyal
 
 (servile labourer)
is now considered by many as a slave status (
 
adimai
 
), a notion widely popularized
by the Dalit movements.
When the villagers are asked to compare what there parents experienced with
the actual situation, many assert without hesitation that they prefer their new
freedom : even if migration is difficult and the regularity of incomes very uncer-
tain, the effect in terms of dignity is incomparable ; they feel that they are more
highly esteemed by their new employers, the 
 
maistries
 
. This new independence is
also expressed in terms of political adherence : the Paraiyars are now free to choose
their own party and many emphasize this point to convince us of their autonomy.
Moreover, the new attraction exerted by the urban poles, led a large number of
landowners to migrate to Chennai or Pondicherry. Today, the 
 
Reddiyar
 
 quarter is
almost uninhabited. Most have maintained ties and return from time to time, but
few of them live permanently in the village. Some have sold part of their land.
Many of them delegate the management of the cultivation, generally to a Vanyar or
a Paraiyar.
All of these elements result in a drastic reduction in the need of labour for the
 
Paraiyars
 
, both in terms of number of people and working days.
The local agricultural labour force has been until 2005 essentially female : the
tasks that require physical strength are done by machines, and in addition, the
women accept to work for lower wages. This high feminization and jeopardization
of agricultural work only illustrates a general tendency observed throughout India
[Harris-White, 2002 ; Kapadia, 1999 ; Marius-Gnanou, 2004a].
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Seasonal migration involved the majority of families until 2005: out of 170
families, it is estimated that more than three-quarters migrate each year. Some
migrate to construction sites, but the majority to the sugar cane sector that is well-
known to them, with three principal destinations : southern Andhra Pradesh (Chit-
toor, Anantapur and Cuddapah districts) from April to June ; eastern Orissa
(Cuttack and Dhenkanal districts) from December to May and occasionally to
Southern Tamil Nadu (Dindigul and Sivagangai districts) from May to July (map).
Orissa is a relatively recent destination (since around 1997), open by one of the
main employers in the region, the Sakhti Group (one of the major refineries in
Tamil Nadu, based in Coimbatore). This enterprise works in direct relation with the
producers to whom it provides the inputs, the fertilizer and the labour for the
harvest. Why to recruit Tamil labourers when Orissa is more than 1 000 km distant
with available labour ? On the one hand, cutting sugar cane requires a minimum
know-how of which the Oriyas have little because sugar cane has just begun to be
developed there. The Tamil represent approximately 60 % of the total labour force
(the remaining 40 % consisting of locals) and are renowned for their rapidity. All
those who migrated to Orissa were 
 
Paraiyars
 
. A few Vanniar families were also
involved in this type of seasonal migration, but they seldom went farther than
southern Tamil Nadu : it is frequent that men migrate alone, leaving the family in
Fig. 1 – Segmented labour market: Examples of Sugarcane harvest
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the village, but most of the Paraiyars very often migrate as a family, taking women
and children along. On the other hand, and the 
 
maistries
 
 were very clear on this
point, it is much easier to control the labourers when they are completely cut off
from their original milieu : it is indeed very difficult for them to leave the place of
work before the end of the season. According to the 
 
maistries
 
, the “escapes” are,
increasingly frequent, but the distance is a good way to re-establish a certain disci-
pline. Even if they think highly of the system, the 
 
maistries
 
, very seldom have
nevertheless a choice. They are connected to an employer (for the most part, the
Sakhti Group) and it is this employer who asks them to go to this or that destination.
Initially the 
 
maistries
 
 were satisfied with this new destination : more generous
incentives from the sugar mills, less pressure in supervising the workers because of
the distance, while in the closer migration zones, the workers constantly ask to go
back a few days to the village.
The workers are organized in groups of 12 to 14 workers (“
 
pannai
 
”) including
the 
 
kiz-maistry
 
 and sometimes the female cook. The advances are individual (or
rather familial), whereas the remuneration is collective and is based on the produc-
tion of each 
 
pannai
 
. The members of the 
 
pannai
 
 are generally from the same
quarter, or even the same street. The collective work presupposes a minimum of
understanding and trust, even if the 
 
maistry
 
 or his 
 
kiz-maistry
 
 is responsible for
settling eventual conflicts.
The arduous work of cutting, cleaning and bundling the cane is carried out by
groups of two or three workers, usually a couple of men, including sometimes a
working woman. Moving with their families, they camp in the open fields with
only a couple of poles and two mats, making an inadequate shelter, with no sanitary
facilities. The sugar cane harvest is an extremely demanding physical work ; the
working hours are generally fixed, around 12 to 14 hours per day (from 6:00 to 13/
14:00 in the morning, then from 2:00 to 7/8:00 in the afternoon, with a slight shift
towards morning during the hot season). According to the male workers, drinking
alcohol (
 
arrack
 
) every night is necessary with such hard work.
Sickness or injuries due to machetes are common and can result in death. Nursing
mothers have to care for their babies during the break periods of their work. The piece
rate system is manipulated so that employees receive less than the minimum wage.
Many of them, being illiterate, are cheated, in various ways, of the small amount that
is due to them. About one third of the harvest workers are women, but payment for
the work of a couple 
 
(jyothi
 
) is given to the man, and the work done by women is not
recognised separately
 
 7
 
, except the work done by the female relatives of the 
 
maistries
 
or female 
 
kiz-maistries
 
 ; few of them are involved in the recruitment of the workers
or in the negociations with landowners or cane officers.
Although harvesting is entirely controlled by the sugar mill owners, these
workers are not deemed to be their employees, but recruited on a contract system
through 
 
maistries
 
 (contractors) from the same villages. The factories advance
 
7. Breman, 1990 and Terink, 1995 have the same observations.
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money to the 
 
maistries
 
, who in turn advance money to the labourers in return for
the commitment of a work for them during the next season. To retain labour, the
employers withhold the greater part of workers’ wages until the end of the season.
This portion is forfeited if workers fall ill and find themselves unable to work. The
wage is paid per ton irrespective of the number of hands that have done the cutting,
so the abundant supply of labour allows flexibility in the production process and
weakens the bargaining power of the workers. The monetary remuneration has
been in 2003, between 120 and 130 Rs. per tonne ; on the other hand, the food is
free in Andhra Pradesh and in Orissa. Initially, the workers were quite reluctant, but
the incentive of an advance, the amount of which is higher than for Andhra Pradesh
and Tamil Nadu, was determinant. For a large part of the year, from the beginning
of the monsoon (July, when the advance has been given) till some time at the end
of harvesting, the cane cutters are indebted to their 
 
maistry
 
.
Because of the distance and the language, the dependence on the 
 
maistry
 
 is
complete, and returning to the village in case of emergency (funeral, ceremony) is
almost impossible. Until 2004, they did not have the choice ; they go where the
 
maistries
 
 bring them. Initially, all these disadvantages were compensated partially
by the amount of the advance.
Since 2004, the advances have been the same whatever the destination, amounting
to around 20 000Rs per head and (40 000 Rs per couple for one year) even in Tamil
Nadu compared to 2000Rs in 2004 (for 6 months). With a Tamil production and
profits to the farmers (Mills pay 1100Rs/t in 2007 ; 800Rs/t in 2005) that increase
again, the salaries are also much higher than in Orissa ; the minimum rate fixed by the
state of Tamil Nadu has sharply increased during these last few years (240-280Rs/t in
Tamil Nadu/150 Rs/t in Orissa). As a consequence, the maistries and therefore the
workers have decided not to go anymore to Orissa or Andhra Pradesh. Today, the
wage negociation is done between the workers and the 
 
maistries
 
 officially registered
by the sugar mills. In the village of our investigation, the 
 
maistries
 
 would get a loan of
100.000Rs-150000Rs from the Mills through the bank. This amount is utilised to a
great extent for the distribution of advances to the worker. The 
 
maistries are renume-
rated by the sugar mills on the basis of a bonus based on the production amount (10Rs/
ton) and by a withdrawal from the workers’ renumeration through a deduction from
the harvest of each pannai (set). Each sunday, an amount of 500Rs for food is given by
the maistry to the pannai. However, from one season to another or from one pannai to
another, the harvested amounts are highly variable ; such variations stem from diffe-
rent factors : the quality of the cane production (fertilizer, irrigation…), the absorption
capacity of the sugar mills, the number of places of harvest and their proximity ; some
pannai change from one place to another 20 to 40 times during the year.
In 2008, the migrants of Thondireddipalayam, almost 300 people were ensured
by their maistry to get a regular employment from November (after Diwali) to
October and to have access to a big advance (40000Rs per couple) to allow them to
save some money 8. For example Anand, 34 years old, working as cane cutter since
8. Interviews conducted with migrant workers of Thondireddipalayma on August 2007 and February 2008.
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the age of 16 has been in Orissa and Andhra Pradesh until 2004, now with his wife,
he got an advance of 40000Rs on October 2007 which allowed him to buy a plot of
20000Rs near his village. He and his wife work all around the South Tamil Nadu
for 11 months leaving their children with his parents who can contact them at
anytime thanks to his cell phone. Thanks to the short distance (one night by bus),
the dependence on the maistry is reduced and the workers can go back to the village
whenever they want for funeral, festival etc…
Today, since the labourers can bargain their advances and their wages with the
maistries, it is inappropriate to consider this system of advance as a debt bondage ;
indeed they do not see themselves as unfree. If the freedom to move or to change the
maistry exists, it is interesting to see through our case study that the freedom to bargain
for better wages is also possible now. However, the wages (240-280 Rs/t in 2007) are
distributed at the end of the season with the advance deducted. Because of this opportu-
nity to get a big advance usually for family matters (wedding, dowry…), workers come
back indebdted for the next season and are in a cycle of permanent indebtedness. But
many workers consider this advance as a a loan which ensures them a job permanently.
Alternative issues : the National Guarantee Rural Employment Act ?
By recognising the existence of bonded labour, Tamil Nadu and most of all Villi-
puram district have been one of the first district to taking some action so as to limit
seasonal migration and the role of jobbers by implementing the National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA). Coming into force in February 2006 in 200
districts (300 000 villages), this Act provides a legal guarantee employment to a limit
of 100 days (7hours/day) to adult members (18-60 years) of any rural household
willing to do unskilled manual work at the statutory minimum wage. It has been
annouced that the NREGA will be extended to the entire country from 2008-2009.
The Gram panchayat registers households after enquirying and issues a job card. The
job card contains the details of an adult member enrolled and his /her photo. A regis-
tered person can submit a written application for work (for a minimum of fourteen
days of continuous work) either to panchayat or to Programme Officer [Drèze, 2004].
An adult who applies under the Act is entitled to being employed in public
works within 15 days. A daily unemployment allowance has to be paid. The
employment has to be provided within a radius of 5 km : if it is above 5 km extra
wage has to be paid. The Act places an enforceable obligation on the state and gives
bargaining power to the labourers ; they have durable legal entitlements. This act
creates accountability ; by contrast, a scheme leaves the labourers at the mercy of
government officials [Dreze, 2004]. In 2006-2007 the NREGA generated one
billion person-days of employment. In the district of Villipuram nearly 70 % of all
rural households have job cards. In rural areas, there is a massive potential for
labour intensive-public works in the field of environmental protection and land
management : watershed development, restoration of tanks and canals, land rege-
neration, roads construction… In July-August 2007, a very large-scale social audit
was conducted in Villupuram district by an informal coalition of Non-Govern-
mental Organisations (NGOs) activitsts, women’s rights organisations and Dalits
P127-142-9782200814584.fm  Page 138  Vendredi, 30. mai 2008  10:53 10
Debt bondage, seasonal migration and alternative issues 139
Autrepart (46), 2008
rights groups called the « NRGEA Watch Tamil Nadu » to assess the impact of the
program on the people. « There we found much evidence of serious efforts to
prevent the spread of corruption in NREGA. For instance, the government of Tamil
Nadu has initiated an imaginative system of muster roll maintenance, whereby each
labourer has to enter his/her signature or thumbprint in the muster roll every day by
way of marking attendance. This ensures not only that the muster roll is available for
public scrutiny at the worksite, as required by the NREGA guidelines, but also that
large numbers of people actually see it every day. In this and other ways, much
progress had evidently been made towards a leak-proof system » [Drèze et alii, 2008].
According to the President of the Panchayat of ThondiReddiPalayam, (who was
for many years a maistry who controlled 500 migrant workers to Orissa), work is
available on a substantial scale in almost every gram panchayat. For example, the
president of the Panchayat has submitted a one-year action plan to the Collector 9
including the number of man days guaranteed and the amount of money needed for
deepening the ponds, restoring the tanks, the channels and the roads 10. This bottom
up process is an opportunity to activate and empower the panchayat raj institutions,
because it will give them a new purpose, backed with substantial financial resources :
in NREGA, the gram sabha 11 can get 10,21 millions Rs per year. In the earlier rural
schemes, it was possible to spend only 300 millions Rs for the entire district.
Our fieldwork in August 2007 and February 2008 suggests that guaranteed
employment has impacted the poorest among the poor, mostly women who cannot
migrate for many reasons (young children, aged, single woman…) ; the participa-
tion of women increased significantly : women’s share of NREGA employment is
above 90 % in this village. As agricultural labourers in their village, they earn
30 Rs a day for five hours of hard work. Today they are happy to get the same salary
as that of the men, -the full minimum wage of 80 Rs a day on NRGEA to restore a
tank or a canal or a pond. By ensuring some economic independence, NRGEA can
be a tool of social change and empowerment for these poor women. However,
according to the BDO officers, the objective of 100 days of employment is not
achieved in Villupuram district. It would appear that some « backward areas » in
the most arid and drought prone regions or not accessible have done better in terms
of days of employment than several of the « advanced » areas (accessible, near the
city…). In contrast to NREGA, which guarantees only 100 days of manual works,
maistries or labour contractors can provide more than 200 days of work in rural
(sugarcane sector) and urban areas (construction sector) with advances. At the state
level, in Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra or Gujarat, less than 100 000 households worked
under the NGREA (less than 26 days of work). However, the person days of
employment per district and households provided with employment were compara-
tively high in the « backward » states such as Madya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan,
9. In each district the Collector, who is also the district magistrate, is the principal representative of the
administration.
10. Interviews conducted with the BDO officers in charge of NGREA on February 2008. In this BDO
office we have consulted the Action plan for Arpisiampalayam (Thondireddipalyam).
11. All men and women in the village who are above 18 years of age form the Gram Sabha.
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Chattisgarh (60 to 80 days of work). We agree with the coordinator, Richard Maha-
patra 12, of the Centre for Science and Environment when he sais. « Casual labou-
rers prefer to bank on NREGA for more assured number of employment days and
the programme has failed to articulate itself as more of a development programme
than a wage employment programme » [Das, 2008].
Anyway, if the NREGA scheme is well implemented and regularly audited, it
could ensure the livelihood of the poorest among the poor of the “backward” areas
where alternative work is not available.
Conclusion
Our case study shows that the system of debt bondage masks a wide range of
situations from the mild to the most severe conditions of labour. Our research
points out also the diversity of the forms of bondage, the multiplicity of explanatory
factors as well as the ambivalence of the advance system. Finally, the persistence
of bondage is a consequence of a weak enforcement of labour laws, of regular
conditions of work contract and migrant labour, which remain in large part unim-
plemented [Srivastava, 2005, p. 35].
However, the problem of debt bondage should be better contextualized : in our
case Tamil Nadu is the third largest economy in India and the most highly urba-
nised state where unskilled labour is available through labour contractors. Futher-
more, Tamil production and profits to the farmers have been increasing since 2004,
the salaries and the advances are also much higher than in Orissa, as a consequence,
the workers and theirs maistries have decided not to go anymore to Orissa. So, we
can consider that the advance is not in itself a criterion of bondage, because as long
as the workers can leave their jobber and/or can bargain their advance, they should
not be considered unfree.
However, in spite of this evolution, we have to admit that the wages are still
miserable and can lock the labourers in a debt trap. Another important condition of
work such as minimum wages has to be provided to the worker. One ray of hope is
NRGEA, the first legislation that compels the State to provide a social safety net,
for the poorest people and seeks to address the urgent issues of bondage, hunger
and rural distress that afflict large parts of rural India.
In our sector where the advance is a key factor in the situations of bondage, if it
seems impossible to remove the advance system (which is requested by the
employers as well as the workers), on the other hand it can be possible to transfer
the advance system to a third organization (bank or NGO) and to ensure the trans-
parency of the work "contract"; this supposes a written contract involving
witnesses, indicating the remuneration, the advance, the mode of repayment and
the mutual obligations of each party and to convince the employers/middlemen, but
also the workers [Guérin et alii, 2004, p. 98].
12. According to a study carried out across nine states.
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At last, only a global approach can pretend to eradicate the problem of bondage
progressively, involving public authorities, employers, job brokers, NGOs and
international organizations.
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